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Ann Elizabeth MayerÕs work addresses her
subject principally during the post-World War
II period, more specifically since the 1948 ratifi-
cation of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights which only Saudi Arabia among Muslim
nations declined to approve. The book d o e s
not treat all possible aspects of the subject but
focuses on specific human rights declarations
and positions that Muslim bodies and selected
prominent Muslim thinkers have propounded.
Within that range, the discussion addresses
Muslim reactions to human rights, Islamic
restrictions on human rights, discrimination
against women and non-Muslims, restrictions
on the rights and freedoms of women, Islamic
human rights schemes and non-Muslims, and
freedom of religion in Islamic human rights
s c h e m e s .
Mayer is both a scholar of classical and mod-
ern Islamic legal thought and a lawyer.
Although her book contains much in the way
of sources and analysis that will be unpalatable
and even repugnant, for very different reasons,
to secular (or religious) humanists on one side
and traditionalist patriarchal thinkers, on the
other, it is a largely dispassionate study of
human rights records and human rights dis-
courses, mostly in the Arab Muslim world.
There are several guiding principles that
inform MayerÕs coverage of her topic through-
out the book. The first is an assumption, based
on her reading of Islamic history and literature,
that Muslims have generally been concerned
about the sorts of ideals, values, and behav-
ioral patterns that undergird modern notions
of human rights. But Mayer rightly warns
against anachronistic modern readings when
treating Islamic or Western ethical and legal
concepts in pre-modern times, because the
discourses that have produced contemporary
international human rights agreements are
decidedly modern in spirit and secular by
design so as to be as inclusive as possible of
diverse peoples and traditions.
A second assumption is that Islam and the
Muslim world have not previously and do not
now constitute a monolithic entity, but exhibit
a wide range of regional and local diversity,
not only in customs and cultures but in theo-
logical, ethical and, particularly, legal tempera-
ments and positions. Closely related to this
assumption is the recognition that what con-
temporary Muslim human rights declarations
call ÔSharica,Õ when qualifying their articles so
as to keep them tightly reefed against the
winds of Western style interpretations, is not
the traditional field of sometimes widely
diverse legal opinions but a simplistic modern
default notion that may unintentionally permit
states and rulers to act absolutely and with
impunity in all kinds of human rights abuses
and challenges, rationalizing their behaviour
as ÔIslamicÕ in some sense. 
A final assumption, or rather conclusion that
has taken the form of an assumption until
proven otherwise, based on careful analysis of
human rights documents and declarations
produced in the Muslim world, is that they are
more focused on limiting than on guarding
human rights.
This last point is really the key critical contri-
bution of the book. It rests on the fundamental
distinction between individual rights and state
power. Whereas in Western democracies indi-
viduals are, in varying ways, protected from
state absolutism, Mayer sees political order-
ings in the contemporary as well as traditional
Arab world, whether Islamic or simply dictator-
ships, as entities against which individual per-
sons have no real rights, although some citi-
zens Ð mainly free adult males Ð may enjoy cer-
tain privileges. Closely related to the pre-emi-
nence of state power is a long-standing dis-
trust of human reason in defining and adjudi-
cating human rights and duties and a strong
preference for guidance based on scripture
and juristic precedent and consensus.
The appearance of a variety of Muslim
authored and ratified human rights declara-
tions in recent years indicates a genuine con-
cern for being connected with international
discourses. It is not prudent, ethical or humane
for a major population in todayÕs international
economic and political environment to absent
itself from a movement that is, for many peo-
ple and nations, as urgent and influential as
human rights. Mayer contends that although
many Muslims fully and enthusiastically sup-
port international human rights norms and
agreements, official Muslim authored declara-
tions seek to engage the subject from a care-
fully framed, conservative Islamic perspective,
yielding as little as possible to secular, interna-
tional, and pluralistic principles. The interna-
tional order (including most Muslim countries)
have their human rights declarations and
agreements, and so now do Muslims in the
sense of a separate community, and both
deserve respect if not general acceptance. 
Mayer summarizes and analyses several such
declarations and comments on what she con-
siders to be their sometimes diverging and
even evasive shifts in meaning between the
original language Ð usually Arabic Ð and trans-
lations into English and/or French. An example
is Article III.a of the Universal Islamic Declara-
tion of Human Rights of 1981, framed by mem-
bers of the London-based Islamic Council of
Europe. In English it reads: ÔAll persons are
equal before the Law and are entitled to equal
opportunities and protection of the Law.Õ The
original Arabic term translated as ÔLawÕ is shari-
ca and not some generic notion of civil law as
understood in the West. Mayer contends that
the uninformed reader might understand this
article in a very different manner than one
accustomed to Islamic legal meanings. ÔThat is,
people are not being guaranteed the equal
protection of a neutral law, but Ôequal protec-
tionÕ under a law that in its pre-modern formu-
lations is inherently discriminatory and there-
by in violation of international standardsÕ (90).
She refers particularly to women and non-Mus-
lims who have a very inferior status under the
S h a r ica than that enjoyed by adult male Mus-
l i m s .
An example of the shading of meaning with
reference to the rights of men and women is
Article 6.a of the Organization of the Islamic
ConferenceÕs ÔCairo Declaration on Human
Rights in IslamÕ of 1990 (and presented at the
UNÕs World Conference on Human Rights in
1993 in Geneva as OICÕs definitive statement at
that time): ÔWoman is equal to man in human
dignity (al-karama al-insaniyya), and has rights
to enjoy as well as duties to perform ÉÕ Mayer
remarks that Article 1.a, also of the Cairo Decla-
ration, shares the evasiveness of Article 6.a: ÔAll
men (sic., i.e. jamiÔ al-nas, meaning Ôhuman
beings, peopleÕ) are equal in terms of basic
human dignity and basic obligations and
responsibilities, without any discrimination on
the grounds of race, colour, language, sex, reli-
gious belief, political affiliation, social status or
other considerationsÕ (86). Mayer comments
that Ôone is alerted to the fact that the failure to
stipulate equality in ÔrightsÕ is not accidental
and that the equality in ÔdignityÕ and Ôobliga-
tionsÕ is not intended to signify equality in
ÒrightsÓÔ (i b i d .). Mayer argues that the ÔIslamic
S h a r icahÕ is not as simple a reality as the Cairo
Declaration, or other similar documents,
appear to assume; but that, as a regulating
concept, it should not generally be expected
to conform with international human rights
s t a n d a r d s .
MayerÕs critical readings do not always lead
her to negative findings with respect to human
rights in Muslim contexts. In the ÔConstitution
of the Islamic Republic of Iran of 24 October
1979 As Amended to 28 July 1989Õ is Article
3.14, setting forth the aims of the Islamic
Republic which include: Ôsecuring the multifar-
ious rights of all citizens, both women and
men, and providing legal protection for all, as
well as the equality of all before the law
[q a n u n]Õ (196). Mayer contends that Ôthe fact
that this provision was retained, even though
it expressed a philosophy of equality that was
radically at odds both with the actual policies
of the regime and with other provisions in the
constitution, is highly significant, because it
shows how much normative force internation-
al human rights concepts retain in Iran despite
the attempts by conservative clerics to dis-
credit themÕ(86). Mayer sees in such examples
signs of hope for the futherance of internation-
al human rights norms in Muslim majority
countries and looks for their definition and
application in distinctively Islamic ways as a
most healthy and potentially productive direc-
t i o n .
Although a cursory reading of her book
might lead one to conclude that Mayer sees
nothing positive in Islam and Muslim societies
regarding human rights, a careful reading will
show that her criticisms are directed almost
entirely towards politically motivated clerics
and others who detest Western thought and
culture and want to maintain as much distance
as possible from them or from what they are
perceived to be. Mayer acknowledges that
there are significant human rights theorists
and activists in the Muslim world, some of
whom appear to consider Islamic human rights
schemes as largely irrelevant. A key problem,
she contends, is that the Islamic human rights
schemes examined in her book all Ôinsist on the
absolute perfection of the abstract Islamic
ideals while ignoring altogether the myriad
problems of institutionalizing and implement-
ing human rights protections and democratiz-
ing closed systems of the Middle EastÕ (190).
There is nothing in Islam that is against human
rights, she appears to be arguing. Rather, it is a
prevalent selective reading and narrow inter-
pretation of the tradition, from a strongly patri-
archal bias, that results in weak, incoherent,
and ineffective attempts towards defining and
institutionalizing authentic human rights for
Muslims in todayÕs world.
MayerÕs book, in its earlier editions, drew
much hostile criticism as well as grateful
praise. Her own very positive evaluation of
some contemporary Islamic discourses on
human rights centres on such figures as the
Sudanese legal specialist Abdullahi An-NaÔim.
Mayer sees in An-NaiÔimÕs extensive scholarly
explorations of human rights an authentic
Muslim voice in harmony with the essentials of
international human rights norms and dis-
courses, making significant contributions to
them. One of the areas of greatest concern is
the practice of some thinkers and countries of
relying on cultural relativism as a means of set-
ting oneÕs own people apart from otherwise
universally held norms. This has been the prac-
tice, for example, of Saudi Arabia since its
refusal to ratify the 1948 Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.
Cultural relativism, ironically, accords in a
certain manner with much maligned ÔOriental-
istÕ thinking by viewing, as Mayer puts it, Ôthe
peoples of the Orient and the Occident as hav-
ing inherently different naturesÕ (12) and thus
unable to adopt each othersÕ ideas and institu-
tions because it would be Ôsomehow incongru-
ous and unnaturalÕ (12). Highly sophisticated
and nuanced anthropological theories of cul-
tural relativism, when simplistically packaged
and crudely used as a policy imperative,
remind me of the oft repeated opinion that
todayÕs Muslims should embrace modernity
but not Westernization, as if the choice were
that simple or even an authentic choice
instead of a confused and misleading shibbo-
l e t h .
The publication of this third edition of
MayerÕs book is most welcome during a period
of increased concern about the general subject
of human rights in a stressed and fractured
world that leaves no major region or people
free from threats to and violation of their
rights. Her well grounded, keenly analytical,
and empathetic book provides a reliable and
extremely clear overview of the subject with
an appropriate amount of challenging techni-
cal legal analysis as well as an abundance of
forthright, independent interpretation. '
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The study of Islam and human rights is a challenging
activity requiring immersion in a complex discourse of
religion, law, culture, politics, postcolonialism, and
comparative ethics, accessed both through texts and
living contexts. The divide between traditional Islamic
and modern Western sensibilities concerning such
issues as individualist versus communal values, rights
versus obligations, and human dignity as distinguished
from human rights, provides ample opportunity for the
testing of everyoneÕs patience, empathy, objectivity,
and simple courtesy. Although this essay primarily
addresses a new edition of a significant book on Islam
and human rights, it views the book as a kind of lens
through which to observe many important aspects of
the general subject.
